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T he	 third	 volume	 of	 Simone	 de	 Beauvoir’s	 autobiography ends	with	a	passage	some	have	found	mystifying:
I	can	still	see	the	hedge	of	hazel	trees	flurried	by	the	wind	
and	the	promises	with	which	I	fed	my	beating	heart	while	
I	stood	gazing	at	the	gold	mine	at	my	feet:	a	whole	life	to	
live.	The	promises	have	all	been	kept.	And	yet,	 turning	
an	 incredulous	 gaze	 toward	 that	 young	 and	 credulous	
girl,	I	realize	with	stupor	how	much	I	have	been	swindled.	
(Beauvoir	1965:	658)1
This	is	the	final	sentence	of	the	book.	
The	passage	 raises	 a	 question	 that	 suggests,	 almost	 immediately,	
too	many	 answers:	How	 could	 one	 be	 swindled	 by	 the	 keeping	 of	
promises?	Because	the	promises	were	foolish	ones,	the	projects	they	
anticipated	not	worthwhile;	because	they	were	exhaustible;	because	
they	have	been	exhausted.	In	the	Paris Review,	Beauvoir	was	asked	to	
clarify	her	intent.
People	 […]	 have	 tried	 to	 interpret	 [the	 final	 sentence]	
to	mean	that	my	life	has	been	a	failure,	either	because	I	
recognize	the	fact	that	I	was	mistaken	on	a	political	level	
or	because	I	recognize	that	after	all	a	woman	should	have	
had	children,	etc.	Anyone	who	reads	my	book	carefully	
can	 see	 that	 I	 say	 the	 very	 opposite,	 that	 I	 don’t	 envy	
anyone,	that	I’m	perfectly	satisfied	with	what	my	life	has	
been,	that	I’ve	kept	all	my	promises	and	that	consequently	
if	 I	had	my	 life	 to	 live	over	again	 I	wouldn’t	 live	 it	 any	
differently.	(Gobeil	1965:	36)
Not	failure,	then.	Still,	looking	back	inspires	a	feeling	of	loss.	I	want	to	
make	sense	of	that.	What,	if	anything,	justifies	retrospective	discontent	
with	a	life	well-lived?
1.	 Originally	published	as	La Force des Choses	 in	 1963.	 I	have	altered	 the	final	
sentence	to	avoid	the	offensive	‘gypped’	for	the	French	‘flouée’.	The	passage	
is	quoted	in	Neiman	2014:	1,	where	I	first	encountered	it.
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even	if	you	abstract	from	that,	comparing	realistic	options,	concert	or	
theatre,	and	deciding	on	the	first,	it	makes	sense	to	feel	ambivalence	
or	unsatisfied	desire,	to	experience	something	like	regret	that	you	did	
not	choose	the	play.	Other	cases	are	more	painful:	suppose	you	must	
choose	between	saving	one	stranger	and	saving	three.	You	decide	to	
save	three	and	you	do	not	think	you	have	made	a	mistake.	Still,	it	is	
rational	to	feel	regret,	or	sadness,	that	you	did	not	save	the	one.	There	
is	no	compensation	for	her	death.
Not	 all	 decisions	 are	 like	 this.	 If	 I	 had	 to	 choose	 between	 fifty	
dollars	and	a	hundred,	I	would	choose	the	hundred,	and	while	I	might	
wish	that	I	could	have	more,	it	would	make	no	sense	to	feel	dismay	
or	disappointment	at	my	decision.	Likewise,	 if	 I	 could	experience	a	
longer	or	a	shorter	pleasure,	and	the	pleasures	were	otherwise	much	
the	same,	I	would	choose	more	over	less,	and	I	would	not	feel	regret.	
In	cases	like	these,	my	loss	is	fully	compensated	by	a	greater	gain.
As	Thomas	Hurka	notes,	we	do	not	need	pluralism	to	make	sense	of	
frustrated	desire	in	choosing	the	greater	good,	if	that	means	appeal	to	
values	or	reasons	of	substantially	different	kinds	(Hurka	1996:	562–4).	
When	I	save	three	instead	of	one,	the	reasons	on	each	side	are	similar;	
it	 is	 just	 that	more	of	 them	point	one	way.	But	as	he	also	notes,	 the	
issue	is	partly	terminological	(Hurka	1996:	564–5).	As	I	use	the	word,	
it	is	sufficient	for	pluralism	that	weaker	reasons	or	lesser	values	have	
residual	force	as	grounds	for	partial	regret.4
4.	 I	disagree	with	Hurka	on	one	point.	He	argues,	plausibly,	that	regret	should	
be	proportioned	to	modal	proximity.	It	is	irrational	to	feel	profound	dismay	
that	I	am	not	an	Olympic	athlete;	it	would	be	more	rational	to	feel	that	way	
if	my	Olympic	dream	were	realistic.	According	to	Hurka,	“when	a	good	does	
not	 obtain,	 the	 degree	 of	 love	 appropriate	 to	 it	 depends	 on	 the	 degree	 to	
which	its	obtaining	is	a	close	possibility”	(Hurka	1996:	559–60).	But	Hurka	
also	 claims	 that	 proximity	 fades	with	 time	 (Hurka	 1996:	 560).	 That	 seems	
wrong.	There	is	no	statute	of	limitations	on	regret,	though	the	intensity	with	
which	it	is	felt	may	rationally	diminish.	When	I	regret	what	happened	at	t,	the	
modal	proximity	that	matters	is	what	was	possible	at	t,	not	what	is	possible	
now.	When	I	think	of	mistakes	I	have	made,	my	desire	to	have	done	other-
wise	is	not	weakened	by	temporal	distance	alone.	It	is	crucial	here	not	to	be	
misled	by	the	force	of	attachment	discussed	in	section	II,	a	force	that	is	quite	
different	from,	though	it	may	correlate	with,	the	passage	of	time.
Part	of	the	interest	of	this	question	lies	in	its	antithesis.	As	well	as	
disappointment	in	a	good	and	happy	life,	there	is	room	for	satisfaction	
and	the	absence	of	regret	in	a	life	that	is	less	fulfilled,	less	happy,	than	
it	 could	 have	 been.	 In	 recent	 work,	 philosophers	 have	 urged	 that	
attachment	to	the	particulars	of	one’s	actual	life	can	be	a	counterweight	
to	frustration,	a	rational	check	on	the	otherwise	unlimited	desire	for	
the	best.2	I	find	this	puzzling.
My	aim	is	to	do	justice	to	both	questions,	to	the	force	of	retrospective	
sadness	when	 life	 is	 no	worse	 than	 it	 could	 have	 been,	 and	 to	 the	
prospect	of	rational	acceptance	when	it	is.	Resolving	these	puzzles	of	
midlife	retrospection	shows	something	general,	and	quite	deep,	about	
the	rational	response	to	reasons,	when	we	know	what	they	are,	and	
when	we	don’t.
I
Some	more	autobiography,	this	time	less	evocative.	I	have	wanted,	at	
various	points	 in	my	 life,	 to	be	a	poet,	 a	physician,	 a	philosopher.	 I	
have	had	the	good	fortune	to	make	a	living	in	philosophy,	and	for	that	
I	am	profoundly	grateful.	But…
Alive	in	my	reflection	are	the	lives	I	have	not	led.	When	I	think	about	
them,	when	I	imagine	them	vividly,	I	can	be	gripped	by	something	like	
regret:	a	sense	of	loss.	I	do	not	believe	I	would	have	a	lived	a	better	life	
in	poetry	or	medicine;	most	 likely,	worse.	And	yet	 I	 feel	dissatisfied	
with	how	things	are.	I	look	back	with	envy	at	my	younger	self,	options	
open,	choices	not	yet	made.	He	could	be	anything.	But	I	am	committed:	
course	set,	path	fixed,	doors	closed.
Part	of	this	phenomenon	has	a	standard	explanation.3	It	turns	on	
the	plurality	of	reasons	or	values.	A	simple	example:	Suppose	you	have	
to	choose	between	going	to	the	theatre	tonight	or	going	to	a	concert.	
The	play	 looks	wonderful,	 the	musician	 is	brilliant;	 each	 is	here	 for	
one	night	only.	You	may	be	 frustrated	 that	you	cannot	do	both.	But	
2.	 See,	in	particular,	Adams	1979;	McMahan	2005:	159–61;	Harman	2009,	2015;	
Wallace	2013.
3.	 For	an	early	discussion,	see	Williams	1963:	173–4.
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my	life	goes	relatively	well,	I	prefer	to	have	more	of	it	to	come.	And	so	
I	envy	my	younger	self.
There	is	a	more	nebulous	temporality	in	Beauvoir’s	account	of	how	
she	was	swindled.
When	 one	 has	 an	 existentialist	 view	 of	 the	world,	 like	
mine,	 the	 paradox	 of	 human	 life	 is	 precisely	 that	 one	
tries	to	be	and,	in	the	long	run,	merely	exists.	It’s	because	
of	 this	discrepancy	that	when	you’ve	 laid	your	stake	on	
being	—	and,	 in	 a	 way	 you	 always	 do	 when	 you	 make	
plans,	even	if	you	actually	know	that	you	can’t	succeed	in	
being	—	when	you	turn	around	and	look	back	on	your	life,	
you	 see	 that	 you’ve	 simply	 existed.	 In	 other	words,	 life	
isn’t	behind	you	like	a	solid	thing,	like	the	life	of	a	god	(as	
it	is	conceived,	that	is,	as	something	impossible).	Your	life	
is	simply	a	human	life.	(Gobeil	1965:	37)
There	are	many	ways	to	read	this	passage.	Does	it	reflect	a	sense	of	
the	unreality	of	the	past?	Or	a	longing	for	one’s	life,	and	the	things	one	
does	 in	 living	 it,	 to	have	an	enduring	presence	 that	 the	 completion	
of	 any	project,	 the	final	 satisfaction	of	 any	desire,	 frustrates?	 I	have	
explored	the	second	idea	elsewhere.5	And	there	may	be	more	threads	
to	unravel.	Still,	whatever	is	true	of	Beauvoir,	I	do	not	think	my	own	
nostalgia	is	exhausted	by	temporal	concerns.	There	is	more	to	it.
A	symptom	of	this	is	that	nothing	so	far	connects	the	temporal	aspect	
of	nostalgia	with	value	pluralism.	Imagine	that	I	make	an	irrevocable	
decision,	at	eighteen,	to	pursue	philosophy.	Nothing	explains	why	it	
is	the	time	before	the	decision	I	envy,	not	the	time	right	after	it.	Either	
way,	my	life	lies	in	the	future,	my	projects	incomplete.	And	either	way,	
there	is	the	fact	that	I	will	miss	out	on	some	of	what	I	most	desire.	Why	
does	the	decision	itself	bring	regret,	a	sense	of	loss	not	about	the	past	
but	about	the	future?
5.	 In	“The	Midlife	Crisis”	(Setiya	2014b).	
If	this	applies	to	desires	that	turn	on	defeated	reasons,	it	applies,	
too,	when	the	reasons	for	one	choice	are	no	stronger	than	the	reasons	
for	 another.	 And	 so	 it	 applies	 to	me.	 Philosopher,	 poet,	 physician:	
these	lives	realize	different	values;	the	reasons	to	want	them	are	not	
the	same.	While	the	case	for	being	a	philosopher	may	not	outweigh	
the	 reasons	 to	prefer	 those	other	 lives,	 it	 is	 good	enough.	 I	 do	not	
regret	my	 choice	 if	 that	means	 thinking	 I	made	 a	mistake,	 at	 least	
compared	 to	 these	 alternatives.	 (They	may	 all	 have	 been	mistakes,	
compared	to	a	life	more	selflessly	given	to	helping	others.)	But	I	feel	
unsatisfied	desire	for	the	lives	I	could	have	led,	for	the	loss	of	valuable	
activities,	replaced	but	not	repaired	by	philosophy.	This	is	what	the	
pluralist	predicts.
So	far,	so	familiar.	But	something	has	yet	to	be	explained.	It	is	not	
just	that	I	feel	a	sense	of	loss	about	the	lives	I	have	not	led,	but	that	
the	sense	is	retrospective.	And	it	is	not	merely	retrospective	because	
its	object	is	an	event,	or	series	of	events,	that	took	place	in	the	past,	
but	because	it	involves	a	retrospective	attitude	to	myself.	I	look	back	
with	envy	at	my	life	at	seventeen,	at	the	unmissed	opportunities,	the	
open	roads.	The	question	is	why.	And	the	answer	is	not	pluralism,	at	
least	not	by	itself.	For	it	was	just	as	true	back	then	that	I	could	not	have	
everything,	that	some	of	my	deepest	desires	would	go	unfulfilled.	My	
prospects	were	no	better.	Nor	was	I	ignorant	of	this,	naively	projecting	
some	synthesis	of	poetry,	medicine,	and	philosophy.	I	knew	I	would	
have	to	choose.	But	I	remember	with	nostalgia	the	time	before	I	did.
An	obvious,	perhaps	irresistible,	thought	is	that	there	is	a	temporal	
dimension	 to	 this	 response.	 As	 Derek	 Parfit	 showed,	 when	 their	
objects	are	patterns	of	experience,	our	preferences	are	“biased	towards	
the	 future”	 (Parfit	 1984:	 165–7).	 In	 Parfit’s	 example,	 I	 wake	 up	with	
amnesia	and	 I	am	told	 that	 I	am	one	of	 two	patients.	Patient	A	had	
a	long	and	painful	operation	yesterday;	patient	B	will	have	a	shorter	
painful	operation	today.	Although	I	will	have	had	more	pain	overall,	I	
hope	that	I	am	patient	A.	The	converse	holds	for	pleasant	experiences.	
I	would	prefer	to	have	a	briefer	pleasant	experience	today	than	to	have	
had	a	longer	pleasant	experience	in	the	past.	No	wonder,	then,	that	if	
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Some	 clarifications	may	 be	 useful	 here.	 The	 first	 is	 that,	while	 I	
envy	my	younger	self	 in	one	respect,	 it	does	not	follow	that	I	prefer	
his	circumstance,	all	things	considered.	Being	seventeen	was	no	picnic,	
in	part	because	it	involved	so	much	uncertainty	about	the	future.	Still,	
there	is	something	enviable	about	it.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	rational	for	
my	younger	self	to	look	forward	to	making	the	decision,	since	then	he	
will	know	—	though	not	for	certain,	and	not	in	much	detail	—	what	the	
future	holds.	
The	second	clarification	is	especially	urgent	 in	 light	of	what	 is	 to	
come.	When	I	say	that,	before	I	made	the	decision,	I	did	not	know	what	
I	would	be	missing,	 I	don’t	mean	 that,	 in	making	 it,	 I	 learned	more	
about	life	as	a	philosopher,	as	opposed	to	the	alternatives	I	gave	up.	
What	I	 learned	is	something	new	about	my	life:	that	I	would	not	be	
a	poet	or	physician.	It	is	knowledge	of	these	facts	that	justifies	regret.
Finally,	 although	 I	 believe	 that	 nostalgia	 for	 lost	 alternatives	 is	
explained	 by	 Specificity,	 I	 don’t	 think	 it	 accounts	 for	 every	 form	 of	
retrospective	suffering.	I	am	less	troubled	by	the	death	of	a	friend	in	
prospect	than	after	the	fact,	not	because	it	is	suddenly	more	specific,	
but	because	it	has	come	to	pass.	The	shift	here	is	temporal,	though	it	
is	not	an	instance	of	future	bias	in	Parfit’s	sense.	It	turns	on	attachment	
to	my	friend	and	the	consequent	desire	that	he	persist.	Nothing	like	
this	holds	for	the	loss	of	options,	which	are	not	objects	of	attachment	
whose	 extinction	 we	 should	 mourn.	 (Section	 II	 will	 dwell	 on	 the	
distinctive	worth	of	people,	 the	value	of	 their	 existence,	 in	 contrast	
with	the	value	of	other	things.)
That	 nostalgia	 has	 an	 epistemic	 origin	 is	 confirmed	 when	 we	
divorce	the	condition	of	ignorance	from	its	temporal	baggage.	Suppose,	
for	instance,	that	I	am	struck	by	retrograde	amnesia.	I	know	that	I	am	
at	midlife,	 that	 I	 am	a	 philosopher,	 poet,	 or	 physician,	 but	 I	 do	not	
remember	 which.	 I	 feel	 a	 certain	 excitement,	 an	 urgent	 curiosity.	 I	
know,	 in	 the	abstract,	 that	 I	 am	 living	only	one	of	 these	 lives,	but	 I	
cannot	feel	regret,	or	loss,	of	the	sort	I	actually	feel.	While	I	would	be	
happy	to	learn	that	I	am	a	philosopher,	I	would	be	disappointed,	too.	
Oddly	enough,	there	is	a	way	in	which	I	envy	my	amnesiac	self	that	
In	order	 to	make	sense	of	 this,	we	must	 take	up	a	neglected	 fact	
about	the	way	in	which	reasons	work.	The	fact	is	that	there	is	a	great	
difference	 between	 knowing	 the	 existence	 of	 reasons	 for	 a	 certain	
attitude	and	knowing	what	the	reasons	are.	It	is	one	thing	to	be	told,	
and	to	believe,	that	there	is	reason	to	want	what	is	behind	the	curtain,	
another	to	know	what	is	there	and	to	see	what	is	good	about	it.	My	
desire	 in	 the	 second	 case	 is	more	 intense.	We	 can	 put	 the	 point	 in	
modest	but	general	terms:
Specificity:	It	can	be	rational	to	respond	more	strongly	to	
a	fact	that	is	a	reason	with	a	certain	weight	than	to	the	fact	
that	there	is	a	reason	with	that	weight.
When	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 you	 to	φ	 it	 can	 be	 rational	 to	
respond	more	strongly	to	knowledge	that	p,	knowledge	that	specifies	
the	reason,	than	to	knowledge	that	there	is	a	reason	of	this	kind.	 In	
the	first	case,	you	are	in	a	position	to	reason	from	the	fact	that	p,	 to	
be	moved	by	the	reason	itself;	in	the	second	case,	your	relation	to	the	
reason	is	mediated	or	indirect.	According	to	Specificity,	this	can	make	
a	rational	difference:	your	motivational	or	affective	response	may	be	
stronger	in	the	first	case	than	the	second.
Specificity	explains	how	the	time	before	I	choose	the	philosophical	
life	differs	 from	 the	 time	when	 the	choice	 is	made.	At	both	 times,	 I	
know	that	there	will	be	reasons	to	regret	my	choice,	to	desire	another	
life,	and	that	these	reasons	are	no	weaker	than	my	reasons	to	choose	
philosophy.	Some	of	my	desires	will	not	be	met.	Before	I	choose,	this	
knowledge	is	abstract	and	general.	Once	I	make	the	irrevocable	choice,	
Specificity	kicks	in:	I	know	what	the	reasons	are.	And	now	I	feel	regret,	
for	 the	 verse	 I	 will	 not	 write,	 the	 lives	 I	 will	 not	 save.	 That	 is	 one	
reason	why	it	is	so	hard	to	decide,	to	let	go	of	valued	possibilities:	one	
anticipates	this	regret,	even	if	one	is	sure	that	one	will	make	the	right	
decision.	And	it	explains	the	sense	of	nostalgia.	Part	of	what	I	envy	in	
my	younger	self	in	the	time	before	the	decision	was	made	is	that	he	
did	not	know	what	he	would	be	missing.	
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Suppose	that	we	admit	all	this.	While	disappointment	in	a	life	well-
lived	 derives	 from	 the	 plurality	 of	 reasons	 or	 values,	 there	 is	more	
to	 the	experience	of	nostalgia.	 It	 is	not	a	 temporal	but	an	epistemic	
phenomenon;	and	it	is	explained	by	Specificity.	The	truth	of	Specificity	
is	confirmed	by	reflection	on	cases	of	normative	parity.	
Two	questions	remain.	The	first	concerns	the	scope	of	Specificity.	
How	far	can	the	rational	response	to	reasons	diverge	from	the	rational	
response	to	facts	about	their	existence	and	relative	weight?	The	other	
is	about	the	opposite	of	loss.	I	have	been	asking	why	you	should	feel	
regret	about	making	the	right	decision.	But	the	reverse	is	possible,	too:	
you	can	 fail	 to	regret	your	mistakes.	You	may	affirm	your	actual	 life,	
and	the	events	that	made	it	possible,	even	when	you	think	you	would	
have	lived	a	better	life	if	things	had	gone	otherwise.	Can	this	be	right?	
I	will	argue	 that	 these	 issues	are	connected:	 the	scope	of	Specificity	
and	 the	 limits	 of	 regret.	 If	 retrospective	 affirmation	 is	 rational,	 it	 is	
explained	 by	 a	 radical	 application	 of	 Specificity.	 I	 will	 develop	 this	
argument	gradually,	asking	how,	and	how	far,	we	can	hope	to	extend	a	
recognized	antidote	to	regret.
II
Begin	with	 a	much-discussed	 case.7	 You	 have	 a	 condition	 that	 will	
affect	any	child	you	conceive	 in	 the	next	 two	months.	The	effect	of	
the	condition	is	that	the	child	will	be	born	with	a	serious,	 incurable	
disorder,	which	affects	his	quality	of	life.	It	might	be	a	heart	abnormality,	
recurrent	migraines,	chronic	joint	pain.	There	is	no	urgent	reason	to	
conceive	a	 child	now,	and	your	decision	will	not	 affect	 the	number	
of	 children	you	eventually	have.	Like	most,	 I	 think	you	should	wait	
to	have	a	child.8	But	suppose	you	do	not	wait,	and	instead	conceive	
7.	 Inspired	by	Parfit	1976.
8.	 Philosophers	have	been	perplexed	about	why.	After	all,	the	child	you	have	
if	you	refuse	 to	wait	would	not	have	been	better	off	 if	you	had	waited:	he	
simply	would	not	exist.	If	you	wait	to	conceive,	you	will	have	a	different	child	
instead.	It	may	seem	to	follow	that	the	child	you	have	if	you	do	not	wait	can-
not	be	harmed	by	your	decision.	And	then	it	is	unclear	what	the	objection	to	
conceiving	him	could	be.	This	is	the	“non-identity	problem”,	which	has	led	to	
coincides	with	nostalgia	for	the	time	of	opportunity	in	my	earlier	life.	I	
envy	not	his	future	but	his	relative	freedom	from	regret,	a	freedom	that	
is	explained	by	Specificity.
The	same	point	holds	in	less	contrived	examples.	Suppose	I	learn	
that	I	will	get	tickets	to	the	concert	or	the	theatre.	It	has	already	been	
decided	which,	but	I	have	not	been	told.	As	in	retrograde	amnesia,	 I	
am	not	 in	 a	 position	 to	 feel	 disappointment,	 yet,	 about	missing	 the	
musician	or	the	play.	That	changes	when	the	tickets	are	revealed.	Now	I	
feel	a	sense	of	loss,	and	a	corresponding	envy	of	the	time	before	I	knew.
	 Specificity	 is	 at	 work	 in	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 has	 drawn	 recent	
attention	in	value	theory.	The	phenomenon	is	that	different	values,	or	
reasons,	are	often	only	 imprecisely	comparable.	This	might	apply	to	
the	case	I	have	just	described,	in	which	you	get	tickets	to	the	concert	or	
the	theatre.	The	reasons	to	want	one	set	of	tickets	may	be	no	stronger	
than	the	reasons	 for	 the	other,	so	 that	 it	 is	 rational	 to	be	 indifferent	
between	 the	outcomes.	But	 the	reasons	are	not	equal	 in	strength.	 If	
they	were,	it	would	be	irrational	to	prefer	one	outcome	to	the	other:	
to	prefer	the	concert	to	the	play,	or	the	play	to	the	concert.	Yet	this	is	
rational,	too;	indifference	is	not	the	only	option.6 
In	Ruth	Chang’s	 terminology,	 the	 relation	between	your	 reasons	
to	want	tickets	to	the	concert	and	your	reasons	to	want	tickets	to	the	
theatre	 is	 one	 of	 normative	 parity:	 not	 equally	 strong,	 but	 also	 not	
outweighed	(Chang	1997).	Parity	is	pervasive	when	reasons	or	values	
are	diverse.	And	parity	relies	on	Specificity:	the	idea	that	one’s	response	
to	a	fact	that	is	a	reason	with	a	certain	weight	may	rationally	outstrip	
one’s	response	to	the	fact	that	there	is	a	reason	with	that	weight.	If	all	
you	knew	was	that	reasons	to	want	two	outcomes,	A	and	B,	were	in	
a	relation	of	normative	parity,	it	would	be	irrational	to	prefer	A	to	B	
or	B	to	A;	indifference	would	be	the	only	option.	That	changes	when	
we	specify	the	outcomes,	for	instance	as	tickets	to	the	concert	or	the	
theatre.	It	changes	through	Specificity.
6.	 This	way	of	thinking	about	imprecision	is	explored	in	Setiya	2007:	77–9	and	
Setiya	2014a:	§3.
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structure,	 one’s	 affirmative	 attitude	 spreads	 backward	
from	 its	 immediate	object,	 as	 it	were,	 encompassing	 as	
well	the	historical	conditions	that	were	necessary	for	the	
existence	of	the	thing	that	one	affirms.	(Wallace	2013:	75)
I	doubt	that	I	affirm	my	own	existence	or	the	existence	of	those	I	love	
in	this	unconditional	way.	As	I	understand	it,	the	test	for	unconditional	
affirmation	 is	 to	 consider	 in	 turn	 each	 causal	 antecedent	 of	 N’s	
existence,	and	to	ask:	What	do	I	now	prefer?	That	it	took	place,	leading	
to	N’s	existence?	Or	not?	Would	I	rewind	time	and	change	the	past	if	
I	 could?	When	 I	 affirm	N’s	existence	unconditionally,	 I	must	always	
answer,	“No,	I	prefer	to	leave	things	as	they	are.”	Wallace	draws	what	
seem	to	be	alarming	consequences.10	If	the	Holocaust	is	in	the	causal	
history	of	my	son’s	birth,	in	that	he	would	not	have	been	conceived	if	
it	had	not	occurred,	unconditional	affirmation	of	my	son’s	existence	
commits	me	to	affirming	the	Holocaust:	preferring	that	 it	happened,	
so	that	my	son	would	be	born,	than	that	it	should	not	have	happened.	
At	best,	I	can	be	conflicted	to	the	point	of	incoherence,	preferring	that	
the	Holocaust	have	happened	while	also	wishing	that	it	had	not.
Does	 that	 ring	 true?	 It	 depends	 on	what	 would	 have	 happened	
otherwise.	 If	 there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 great	 reduction	 in	 human	
suffering	and	injustice,	I	do	not	think	I	can	prefer	that	the	Holocaust	
have	taken	place,	so	that	I	and	my	son	exist.	With	regret	but	without	
incoherence,	 I	prefer	that	 it	had	not.	 If	 the	alternative	is	some	other	
atrocity,	this	may	change.	Either	way,	these	questions	of	counterfactual	
history	 seem	 quite	 distant	 from	 any	 ordinary	 sense	 in	 which	 I	 am	
attached	to	my	son	and	thus	affirm	his	life.	I	suspect	that,	as	Wallace	
defines	these	terms,	my	affirmation	of	my	own	existence,	and	that	of	
everyone	I	love,	is	thoroughly	conditional.11	Nor	do	we	need	the	idea	
of	 unconditional	 affirmation	 in	 order	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 original	
10.	 See	Wallace	2013:	Ch.	6.
11.	 Wallace	suggests	that	unconditional	affirmation	is	typical	of	attachment	and	
that	abandoning	it	would	not	be	easy	(Wallace	2013:	77,	255);	but	he	does	not	
argue	for	these	claims.
and	give	birth	to	N,	who	has	the	expected	condition.	His	life	goes	well,	
on	the	whole,	though	marred	by	medical	intervention,	or	predictable	
suffering,	from	time	to	time.	Should	you	now	regret	your	decision?	It	is	
tempting	to	say	no.	While	the	decision	was	a	mistake,	one	you	should	
not	have	made,	it	is	now	rational	to	be	glad	that	you	decided	not	to	
wait.	You	 love	N,	who	 is	happy	 to	be	alive,	and	he	would	not	have	
existed	if	you	had	waited	to	have	a	child.
We	can	describe	the	shift	here	in	terms	of	preference.	Before	you	
conceive	N,	you	should	prefer	 to	wait.	When	N	 is	born,	you	should	
prefer	that	you	did	not.9	It	is	at	least	rational,	now,	to	prefer	the	worlds	
in	which	you	do	not	wait	to	the	worlds	in	which	you	do.	The	existence	
of	your	child	thus	insulates	you	from	regret	—	if	not	entirely,	then	to	
some	degree.	That	N	exists	is	a	reason	to	be	glad	that	you	did	not	wait,	
even	though	it	remains	true,	throughout,	that	you	should	have	waited,	
and	that	you	should	have	preferred	to	wait,	back	when	you	could.
There	is	a	lot	to	say	about	this	case,	though	it	is	not	my	principal	
topic.	My	account	of	it	is	close	to	that	of	Elizabeth	Harman	(2009)	and	
R.	Jay	Wallace	(2013:	80–96).	But	I	want	to	mark	two	differences.	First,	
unlike	them,	I	doubt	that	the	reason	to	prefer	that	N	exists,	now	that	he	
does,	is	specific	to	his	mother,	or	that	it	rests	on	parental	attachment.	
As	I	have	argued	elsewhere,	there	is	impersonal	reason	to	affirm	the	
existence	 of	 those	 who	 now	 exist	 (Setiya	 2014c).	 Second,	 Wallace	
holds	 that	when	we	 are	 attached	 to	 another	 person,	 or	 to	 our	 own	
existence,	it	becomes	an	object	of	“unconditional	affirmation”:
One	does	not	merely	affirm	these	objects,	given	that	the	
necessary	 causal	 conditions	 for	 them	 obtained;	 rather,	
one	 is	 glad	 on	 balance	 that	 those	 objects	 are	 in	 fact	
part	of	the	history	of	the	world,	taking	into	account	the	
totality	of	 things	 that	 they	 involved.	 In	a	 case	with	 this	
serious	disputes	about	the	nature	of	harm.	(See,	along	with	Parfit,	Woodward	
1986,	Shiffrin	1999,	and	McMahan	2005:	144–7.)	I	will	set	this	problem	aside.	
Whatever	the	explanation,	I	assume	that	you	should	prefer	to	wait.
9.	 I	take	no	stand	on	when,	exactly,	the	change	occurs	between	conception	and	
birth,	or	on	related	issues	in	the	ethics	of	abortion.
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In	 Woolf’s	 case:	 by	 novels.	 Six	 years	 later,	 Orlando	 is	 praised	 as	 a	
masterpiece	in	the	Manchester Guardian,	and	Woolf	reflects	again.
Orlando	is	recognized	for	the	masterpiece	that	it	is.	The	
Times	does	not	mention	Nessa’s	pictures.	Yet,	she	said	last	
night,	I	have	spent	a	long	time	over	one	of	them.	Then	I	
think	to	myself,	So	I	have	something,	instead	of	children,	
&	fall	comparing	our	lives.	I	note	my	own	withdrawal	from	
those	desires;	my	absorption	in	what	I	call,	 inaccurately,	
ideas:	this	vision.	(Woolf	1980:	217)
An	actual	life	is	not	a	thought	experiment.	A	sister	is	not	a	counterfactual	
self.12	But	Woolf	is	raising	the	question	I	want	to	ask:	whether	and	how	
attachment	 to	 things	other	 than	people,	 to	activities	or	objects,	 like	
Orlando,	masterpiece	that	it	is,	can	change	what	it	is	rational	to	want,	
so	 that	one	 is	 sheltered	 from	 regret.	Woolf’s	 life	does	not	present	 a	
perfect	case	for	answering	this	question,	in	part	because	it	is	not	clear	
that	she	made	a	mistake	in	not	having	children,	or	that	she	thinks	she	
did,	 in	part	because	her	achievements	as	a	novelist	are	 too	great.	 It	
will	take	work	to	separate	the	various	factors	that	might	explain	and	
justify	a	shift	in	retrospective	preference,	so	as	to	bring	my	question	
into	view.	I	will	do	so	by	considering	other	cases,	altering	them	step	by	
step	to	isolate	the	contrast	between	attachment	to	persons,	activities,	
and	things.
We	can	start	with	a	variation	on	the	case	of	waiting	to	conceive	a	
child	discussed	by	Elizabeth	Harman.	She	imagines	parents	of	a	child	
born	deaf	considering	cochlear	implants.	She	stipulates	that	the	child	
would	 benefit,	 overall,	 from	 receiving	 the	 implants:	 his	 life	 will	 be	
worse	without	them.	The	parents	should	prefer	the	operation,	but	they	
decide	against	 it.	Years	 later,	 looking	back	on	 this	mistake,	Harman	
argues	that	it	may	be	rational	for	the	parents	not	to	feel	regret,	even	
though,	“as	things	actually	are,	they	are	impersonally	worse,	worse	for	
12.	 Compare	Miller	 (2012:	 169):	 “To	desire	someone	else’s	 life,	 to	be	someone	
else….”	These	are	not	the	same.
case,	the	one	in	which	you	decide	not	to	wait	and	so	conceive	and	give	
birth	to	N.	All	we	need	is	that	your	son’s	existence	is	a	reason	to	prefer	
that	 you	did	not	wait.	Considering	 that	particular	 antecedent	of	his	
coming	to	be,	you	now	prefer	that	it	took	place.	Though	your	decision	
was	a	mistake,	you	would	not	rewind	time	and	change	it	if	you	could.
My	interest	is	less	in	this	particular	case	than	in	the	phenomenon	it	
illustrates.	It	can	be	rational	not	to	regret	a	bad	decision,	a	decision	you	
should	not	have	made,	even	when	its	consequences	are	just	what	you	
would	expect.	More	generally,	it	can	be	rational	not	to	wish	that	some	
past	event	had	not	occurred,	even	though	you	should	have	preferred	
this	at	the	time,	and	this	fact	about	your	earlier	preference	does	not	
turn	on	misconceptions	about	the	future.	This	can	happen	when	the	
decision	or	 event	 leads	 to	 the	 existence	of	 a	 particular	 person	who	
would	 not	 have	 existed	 otherwise.	How	 far	 does	 this	 phenomenon	
extend?	Can	attachments	of	other	kinds	play	a	similar	role	in	limiting	
regret,	making	it	rational	not	to	prefer	what	you	concede,	at	the	time,	
there	was	most	reason	to	prefer?
The	question	is	not	academic.	My	thinking	about	it	has	been	shaped	
by	Andrew	Miller’s	work	on	Virginia	Woolf.	 In	a	lyrical	essay,	Miller	
draws	out	a	similar	theme	in	Woolf’s	reflections	on	her	own	life	as	a	
novelist	(Miller	2012).	Woolf’s	diaries	are	intermittently	preoccupied	
with	her	decision	to	remain	childless	and	with	the	divergent	life	of	her	
sister,	Vanessa	Bell.	From	an	entry	dated	January	2,	1923:
We	 came	 back	 from	Rodmell	 yesterday,	&	 I	 am	 in	 one	
of	my	moods,	 as	 the	 nurses	 used	 to	 call	 it,	 today.	 And	
what	 is	 it	&	why?	A	 desire	 for	 children,	 I	 suppose;	 for	
Nessa’s	life;	for	the	sense	of	flowers	breaking	all	around	
me	involuntarily.	[…]	Years	&	years	ago,	after	the	Lytton	
affair,	 I	 said	 to	 myself,	 walking	 up	 the	 hill	 at	 Beireuth,	
never	 pretend	 that	 the	 things	 you	 haven’t	 got	 are	 not	
worth	having;	good	advice	I	think.	At	least	it	often	comes	
back	to	me.	Never	pretend	that	children,	for	instance,	can	
be	replaced	by	other	things.	(Woolf	1978:	221)
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Consider,	 then,	 the	 life	 of	 a	 deaf	 person,	 as	 it	 appears	 from	 her	
own	perspective.	In	a	path-breaking	article,	Robert	Adams	took	up	the	
remarkable	case	of	Helen	Keller,	arguing	 that	 she	should	not	 regret	
her	childhood	illness.13
Would	 it	have	been	 reasonable	 for	Helen	Keller,	 as	an	
adult,	to	wish,	for	her	own	sake,	that	she	had	never	been	
blind	or	deaf?	I	think	not.	Let	us	suppose	that	she	would	
have	had	an	even	better	and	happier	life	if	her	sight	and	
hearing	had	been	spared	(though	that	is	not	obviously	
true).	But	whatever	 its	excellences,	 that	 life	would	not	
have	had	one	day	 in	 it	 that	would	have	been	very	 like	
any	 day	 of	 her	 actual	 life	 after	 the	 age	 of	 19	 months.	
Her	actual	 life	—	in	 its	emotional	as	well	as	 its	 sensory	
qualities,	in	its	skills	and	projects,	and	doubtless	in	much	
of	her	personality	and	character	—	was	built	around	the	
fact	of	her	blindness	and	deafness.	That	other,	happier	
life	would	have	contained	few	of	the	particular	joys	and	
sorrows,	trials	and	triumphs	—	in	short	very	little	of	the	
concrete	 content	—	that	 she	 cared	 about	 in	 her	 actual	
life.	Her	 never	 having	 been	 blind	 or	 deaf	would	 have	
been	very	like	her	never	having	existed.	Why	should	she	
wish	for	that,	given	that	she	had	reason	to	be	glad	she	
existed?	(Adams	1979:	60)
Again,	this	is	not	a	case	in	which	someone	else	would	have	existed	if	
things	had	gone	otherwise.	Not	being	blind	or	deaf	would	have	been	
like	nonexistence	 for	Helen	Keller	only	 in	being	very	different	 from	
existing	as	she	did.	We	are	asked	to	assume	that	she	would	not	only	
exist	but	be	happier	that	way.	The	claim	is	that	she	may	still	prefer	her	
actual	life.	Perhaps	that	is	true,	but	again	it	is	puzzling.	Why	not	wish	
for	the	best?
13.	 For	similar	claims,	see	Wallace	2013:	124–8;	Harman	2015.
the	parents,	and	worse	for	their	child	than	things	would	have	been	if	
their	child	had	been	cured”	(Harman	2009:	186).
The	 deaf	 child’s	 parents	 could	 grant	 that	 things	 would	
have	 been	 better	 if	 their	 child	 had	 not	 been	 deaf.	 But	
things	would	have	been	very different.	They	feel	that	they	
would	 have	 then	 had	 a	 different child	—	not	 numerically	
a	different	child,	but	a	child	with	a	completely	different	
personality,	 character,	 and	 sense	 of	 self	 from	 the	 child	
they	actually	have.	In	loving	their	child,	they	love	who	he	
has	become.	They	are	glad	he	has	become	who	he	is,	they	
value	him	 as	 he	 is,	 and	 they	 cannot	 prefer	 that	 he	had	
come	 to	 be	 so	 different	—	indeed,	 they	 prefer	 things	 as	
they	are.	Surely	these	preferences	are	utterly	reasonable.	
(Harman	2009:	185)
These	preferences	may	be	 reasonable,	 but	 they	 seem	very	 different,	
and	much	more	 puzzling,	 than	 your	 preference	not	 to	 have	waited,	
now	 that	N	exists.	 In	 the	earlier	 case,	 you	are	attached	 to,	 and	care	
about,	N,	who	would	be	no	better	off	if	you	had	waited.	He	would	not	
then	exist.	In	Harman’s	case,	it	is	assumed	that	the	child	would	both	
exist	and	be	better	off	with	cochlear	implants.	Does	it	really	“makes	
sense	 to	 prefer	 one’s	 twenty-year-old	 deaf	 child	 as she is	 because	
one	 loves	her	as she is”,	weighing	your	attachment	 to	her	distinctive	
character	more	strongly	than	her	own	well-being	(Harman	2009:	187)?	
Shouldn’t	parental	love	be	more	selfless	than	that?
A	 complication	 here	 is	 that	 the	 parents’	 preference	 is,	 in	 part,	
vicarious.	 It	 is	 consequently	vital	 to	 their	 retrospective	attitude,	and	
its	justification,	how	their	son	feels	about	his	own	life.	Harman’s	claim	
is	much	more	plausible	if	the	son	himself	prefers	being	deaf	and	does	
not	wish	the	operation	had	been	performed.	If	he	resents	his	parents’	
decision,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	their	attachment	to	him	as	he	is	could	
absolve	them	from	regret.	Before	asking	about	the	parents,	we	should	
ask	what	it	is	rational	for	their	son	to	prefer.
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There	 are	 two	 final	 complications	 to	 set	 aside.	 The	 first	 is	 risk	
aversion.	 It	may	be	 rational	 to	prefer	 the	 certainty	of	 a	 good	 life	 to	
the	likelihood	of	a	better	life	with	a	risk	of	one	that	is	worse.	When	I	
was	deciding	at	eighteen,	there	was	risk	either	way.	But	when	I	look	
back	now	and	think	about	rewinding	time	to	the	point	of	decision	and	
becoming	 a	 doctor,	 I	must	 factor	 in	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 outcome,	
weighing	 that	 risk	 against	 the	 knowledge	 of	my	 actual	 life.	 If	 I	 am	
risk-averse,	I	may	prefer	the	status	quo.	We	need	to	abstract	from	this,	
stipulating,	however	artificially,	that	I	am	certain	that	a	life	in	medicine	
would	have	turned	out	well.
The	 second	 complication	 is	 personal	 attachment.	 One	 way	 in	
which	my	 life	 would	 have	 been	 different	 if	 I	 had	 been	 a	 doctor	 is	
that	 I	would	 have	met	 different	 people.	 I	would	 have	 had	 different	
friends,	a	different	wife	or	child,	or	none	at	all.	It	may	be	rational	to	
form	attachments	 to	particular	people	 in	which	one	would	prefer	 a	
relationship	with	 them	at	some	cost	 to	one’s	own	well-being	over	a	
similar	 relationship	with	others.	 Imagine	 comparing	 two	options	 in	
prospect,	not	having	met	either	N	or	M.	Option	1	is	friendship	with	N	
and	a	life	of	moderate	flourishing.	Option	2	is	friendship	with	M	and	a	
more	successful	life.	You	should	prefer	option	2.	But	suppose	you	find	
yourself	in	option	1.	It	may	be	rational,	now,	to	prefer	that	option.	To	
rewind	time	and	replace	option	1	with	option	2	would	be	to	inhabit	
a	world	in	which	you	never	know	N,	to	whom	you	are	now	attached.	
You	would	not	give	 that	up	 for	 a	better	 life.16	Again,	 at	 the	price	of	
artificiality,	let	us	stipulate	that	I	will	have	relationships	with	the	same	
the	change	in	what	it	is	rational	to	want.	Nor	can	we	explain	why	it	is	rational	
not	just	to	be	content	with	what	is	worse	but	to	prefer	it	to	the	better	outcome.
16.	 This	is	argued	by	McMahan	2005:	159–61.	We	may	wonder	how	far	it	goes.	
What	if	the	cost	of	the	relationship	affects	not	you	but	N?	Option	1	is	friend-
ship	with	N,	who	is	doing	fine,	as	is	M.	Option	2	is	a	similar	friendship	with	M,	
who	is	doing	fine,	and	a	more	successful	life	for	N.	Prospectively,	you	should	
prefer	option	2.	But	suppose	you	find	yourself	in	option	1.	Is	it	now	rational	
to	prefer	that	option?	You	must	weigh	your	attachment	to	N	against	his	well-
being.	Is	it	plausible	that	the	former	wins	out?
Once	more,	 there	are	complications.	As	Adams	acknowledges,	 it	
is	 far	 from	obvious	 that	Helen	Keller	would	have	 lived	a	better	and	
happier	 life	 if	 her	 illness	 had	 not	 left	 her	 deaf	 and	 blind.	 Her	 life	
was	extraordinary.	Even	with	 lives	 that	are	 less	exceptional,	 there	 is	
substantial	controversy	about	the	status	of	disabilities,	like	being	deaf	
or	being	blind,	as	net	harms.14	According	to	the	“mere-difference”	view,	
while	the	life	prospects	of	those	born	deaf	or	blind	may	be	worse,	as	
things	stand,	than	the	life	prospects	of	others,	we	should	treat	these	
conditions	 as	 forms	 of	 human	 diversity	 akin	 to	 race,	 gender,	 and	
sexual	orientation.	If	particular	conditions	generate	hardship,	that	is	a	
social	problem,	not	a	mark	of	human	defect.
I	take	no	stand	on	the	mere-difference	view,	but	I	want	to	sidestep	
this	 dispute.	 We	 can	 do	 so	 by	 engaging	 in	 some	 counterfactual	
autobiography.	 Near	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 essay,	 I	 told	 you	 of	 my	
conflicting	desires,	to	be	a	poet,	physician,	and	philosopher.	Suppose,	
however,	that	I	lied	about	a	crucial	fact:	I	was	convinced	that	I	ought	
to	be	a	doctor,	that	this	was	the	better	choice,	more	meaningful,	less	
selfish	than	philosophy.	And	yet,	scared	of	 the	sight	of	blood,	 I	was	
unable	 to	 follow	 through	—	and	 so	 I	 took	 philosophy	 instead.	 My	
discomfort	with	blood	was	not	enough	to	justify	my	choice,	nor	did	
I	 think	otherwise.	My	action	was	akratic.	But	 it	shaped	my	future	 in	
pervasive	ways.	 I	know	a	great	deal	about	 life	as	a	philosopher,	 the	
highs	and	lows	of	teaching	and	research,	the	collegiality	and	frustration.	
I	know	much	less	about	medicine.	Now	I	 look	back	on	my	decision.	
Life	 in	philosophy	has	been	good,	overall.	But	 I	 still	 think	 I	made	a	
mistake:	 I	 should	have	been	a	doctor.	 Is	 it	 rational	 to	be	glad	 that	 I	
made	this	mistake?	What	could	make	it	rational?15 
14.	 Here	I	am	indebted	to	Barnes	2014.
15.	 We	cannot	appeal	to	“satisficing”:	choosing	a	good	enough	option	when	you	
know	that	 it	 is	not	the	best.	While	 it	may	be	rational	 to	choose	an	inferior	
option	when	you	do	not	know	what	the	best	option	is,	it	seems	irrational	to	
prefer	an	option	you	know	is	not	the	best	when	you	know,	of	some	specific	
alternative,	 that	 it	 is	better.	That	 is	what	happens	 in	my	case.	Moreover,	 if	
satisficing	is	rational,	it	is	rational	before	you	decide	as	well	as	after.	Even	if	
we	grant	the	rationality	of	satisficing	preference,	we	have	no	explanation	of	
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things?	If	there	is	a	case	against	regret	in	connection	with	these,	it	is	
different	from	the	case	of	your	relationship	with	N.
Begin	 with	 artifacts,	 like	 Woolf’s	 Orlando.	 Does	 their	 actuality	
affect	what	it	is	rational	to	want?	I	do	not	think	it	does.	Imagine	two	
paintings,	 A	 and	 B,	 as	 vividly	 as	 you	 can,	 that	 have	 the	 following	
property:	if	neither	existed,	and	there	could	be	only	one,	you	should	
prefer	the	existence	of	B.	Perhaps	A	is	Matisse’s	study	for	Dance,	while	
B	 is	Dance	 itself	—	though	examples	are	always	contentious.	You	are	
in	the	hypothetical	circumstance	 in	question:	neither	A	nor	B	exists,	
and	you	prefer	the	existence	of	B.	Suppose	you	learn	that	A	exists	and	
B	does	not.	Does	 this	affect	what	 it	 is	 rational	 to	want?	Could	 it	 tip	
the	balance,	 so	 that	 you	now	have	 sufficient	 reason	 to	be	glad	 that	
A	exists?	Shouldn’t	you	prefer	 to	 rewind	 time,	 if	B	would	 then	exist	
instead	 of	A?	 I	would	 say	 so.	Now	 imagine	 that	 you	 know	nothing	
about	 A	 and	 B,	 except	 that	 they	 are	 paintings	 and	 that	 B	 is	 more	
beautiful.	Prospectively,	you	prefer	the	existence	of	B.	Again,	you	learn	
that	A	exists	instead.	Should	you	be	glad	that	things	turned	out	this	
way,	out	of	a	reasonable	attachment	to	the	actual?	Surely	not.
We	 must	 not	 be	 distracted,	 here,	 by	 the	 conservative	 attitude	
embraced	by	 Jerry	Cohen	 in	his	 “defence	of	 existing	value”	 (Cohen	
2011).	 Cohen’s	 conservative	 declines	 to	 replace	 existing	 valuable	
things	—	institutions,	 works	 of	 art,	 etc.	—	with	 ones	 that	 would	 be	
slightly	 better,	 in	 that	 we	 should	 prefer	 the	 replacements	 to	 what	
actually	exists	if	we	were	starting	from	scratch.	This	attitude	may	be	
rational,	 but	 it	 is	 not	what	we	 are	 considering.	 The	 issue	 raised	 by	
conservatism	is	whether	to	preserve	existing	things	or	to	destroy	and	
replace	 them.	We	 compare	 two	 futures,	 holding	 the	past	 fixed,	 and	
ask	which	there	 is	 reason	to	prefer.	My	question	 is	different.	 It	calls	
for	a	comparison	of	two	world-histories	including	changes	in	the	past	
whose	 effect	 is	 that	 an	 object	 would	 never	 exist.	 One	 could	 value	
preservation	and	so	be	averse	to	trading	up	without	being	attached	to	
what	is	actual	so	that	one	prefers	the	creation	of	A	to	the	creation	of	
B	in	retrospect.	If	A	now	exists,	I	might	not	prefer	its	destruction	and	
replacement	by	B,	but	I	should	prefer	that	B	existed	all	along.	
people	whatever	I	choose,	though	the	character	of	those	relationships	
may	change.
We	have,	 at	 last,	 a	 pure	 case	 to	 consider,	 one	 in	which	 the	 only	
difference	between	my	situation	before	and	after	is	engagement	with	a	
particular	life,	as	a	philosopher,	that	I	rightly	judged	inferior.	There	have	
been	no	surprises	on	that	front,	nor	am	I	attached	to	people	I	would	
not	have	known	 if	 I	had	been	a	doctor	 instead.	Does	 it	make	sense	
to	be	attached	to	other	aspects	of	my	life,	to	the	activities	that	make	
it	up,	some	of	them	shared	with	friends,	or	to	the	objects	with	which	
I	interact,	in	a	way	that	justifies	a	retrospective	shift	in	preference?	Is	
it	rational	to	treat	the	occurrence	of	these	activities,	the	existence	of	
these	objects,	as	you	treat	the	actual	existence	of	N?	Adams,	Harman,	
and	Wallace	answer	yes.17
What	we	are	attached	to	in	ourselves,	in	a	reasonable	self-
concern,	 is	 not	 just	 our	 bare	metaphysical	 identity,	 but	
also	projects,	friendships,	and	at	least	some	of	the	most	
important	features	of	our	personal	history	and	character.	
If	our	lives	are	good,	we	have	the	same	sort	of	reason	to	
be	glad	we	have	had	them	rather	 than	 lives	 that	would	
have	been	even	better	but	too	thoroughly	different,	as	we	
have	to	be	glad	that	we	exist	and	not	better	and	happier	
people	instead	of	us.	(Adams	1979:	64)
For	 these	 philosophers,	 actual	 projects	 are	 like	 actual	 relationships	
or	 actual	 people:	 their	 existence	 alters	 the	 landscape	 of	 reasons,	
changing	what	 it	 is	 rational	 to	want.	Thus	Harman	 (2015)	writes	of	
our	 “reasonable	 attachment	 to	 the	 actual”,	 as	 if	 it	 were	 a	 pervasive	
orientation	 to	 what	 matters.	 I	 am	 sceptical.	 Wallace	 may	 be	 right	
that	“[actual]	human	beings	[…]	make	claims	on	us	[…]	that	merely	
possible	 people	 do	 not”	 (Wallace	 2013:	 89).	 But	 projects,	 activities,	
17.	 The	quotation	is	from	Adams;	it	is	echoed	by	Wallace	(2013:	77),	in	the	stron-
ger	terms	of	unconditional	affirmation,	and	by	Harman	(2015).
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forward.20	The	latter	idea	is	akin	to	Cohen’s	conservatism:	it	involves	
a	 conservative	 attitude	 to	 one’s	 existing	 projects.	 This	 may	 reflect	
concern	for	the	integrity	of	one’s	commitments	or	the	narrative	arc	of	
life,	and	it	may	be	rational.	But	again,	it	is	not	what	we	are	considering.	
Concern	 for	 narrative	 would	 make	 sense	 of	 a	 desire	 to	 complete	
one’s	 existing	 projects,	 not	 abandon	 them,	 going	 forward.	 It	would	
not	justify	a	retrospective	preference	for	the	past	as	it	is,	pursuing	A	
rather	than	B,	when	I	should	have	chosen	otherwise.	If	I	am	doing	A,	
I	might	prefer	not	to	quit	and	try	B	instead,	but	I	should	still	prefer	a	
life	in	which	I	pursued	B	all	along,	a	life	that	does	as	well	as	mine	by	
narrative	lights.21
In	neither	case,	then	—	that	of	artifacts	or	that	of	activities	—	does	
actual	 existence	 have	 the	 significance	 it	 does	 when	 you	 conceive	
and	give	birth	to	N.	In	Kantian	terms,	while	human	lives	have	dignity,	
activities	 and	 artifacts	 have	 price:	 their	 value	 can	 be	 replaced.	 It	 is	
the	dignity	of	human	life	that	explains	why	you	should	not	prefer	to	
rewind	time,	erase	your	son,	and	try	again.	Nothing	like	this	applies	
to	 the	activities	 that	make	up	your	 life	and	the	artifacts	 that	engage	
them.	 In	 saying	 this,	 I	 do	 not	 reject	 outright	 a	 preference	 for	 one’s	
actual	life	over	lives	that	would	have	been	better	in	prospect,	a	rational	
attachment	to	its	particular,	determinate	shape.	But	I	doubt	that	it	is	
explained	by	the	rational	significance	of	actuality.	Can	it	be	justified	in	
some	other	way?
We	 can	make	 progress	 by	 noting	 that,	 ordinarily,	 two	 things	 go	
together:	 actuality	 and	 specific	 knowledge.	When	 I	 have	 to	 choose	
between	 two	options,	A	 and	B,	 such	 that	B	 is	 better	 and	A	 is	what	
20.	For	a	defence	of	this	claim,	see	Kelly	2004.
21.	 This	 argument	 bears	 on	 the	 rationality	 of	 “adaptive	 preference	 change”,	 in	
which	one	ceases	to	desire	activities	or	outcomes	in	response	to	their	being	
unfeasible.	 In	 a	 seminal	 discussion,	 Jon	Elster	 argued	 that	 adaptive	 prefer-
ence	change	is	rational	when	and	only	when	it	is	intentionally	induced;	he	
called	this	“character	planning”	(Elster	1983:	Ch.	III).	I	am	sceptical.	It	is	ratio-
nal	to	adjust	one’s	intentions	to	changes	in	feasibility,	and	it	is	rational	to	avoid	
preoccupation	with	the	failure	to	get	what	one	prefers;	but	a	preference	that	
is	otherwise	irrational	cannot	be	justified	by	shifts	in	feasibility,	as	such.
What	 if	we	 turn	 from	artifacts	 to	 activities	 or	 projects,	 including	
creative	acts,	like	writing	Orlando	or	painting	Dance?	It	is	a	commonplace	
in	the	philosophy	of	action	that	intentions	place	constraints	on	practical	
thought.	When	you	intend	to	do	A,	there	is	rational	pressure	to	follow	
through,	to	intend	what	you	know	to	be	the	necessary	means.	But	it	is	
also	a	commonplace	that	there	are	serious	obstacles	to	conceiving	this	
pressure	in	terms	of	the	provision	of	reasons.18	Suppose	I	am	deciding	
whether	to	do	A	or	B.	That	I	now	intend	A	does	not	provide	me	with	
a	new	reason	to	do	it,	or	to	take	appropriate	means.	If	it	did,	we	could	
engage	in	illicit	bootstrapping:	an	irrational	decision	could	transform	
an	action	I	should	not	perform	into	one	that	I	should	by	tipping	the	
balance	of	 reasons.	That	 is	not	possible.	Nor	 is	 the	point	specific	 to	
reasons	for	acting.	The	actuality	of	a	project	does	not	give	reasons	for	
preference	or	intensify	the	reasons	that	were	already	there.	It	would	
be	 another	 form	 of	 illicit	 bootstrapping	 to	 defend	 a	 retrospective	
preference	for	doing	A	over	doing	B,	when	I	should	have	preferred	B,	
by	appeal	to	the	fact	that	I	am	actually	doing	A.	This	is	quite	different	
from	explaining	why	you	are	glad	you	did	not	wait	to	have	a	child	by	
appeal	to	the	presence	of	N.
This	 negative	 claim	—	that	 actual	 projects	 provide	 no	 further	
reasons	—	might	be	qualified	in	cases	of	parity,	where	there	is	no	more	
reason	to	do	A,	or	B,	and	the	reasons	are	not	precisely	equal.	Maybe	
one’s	decision	can	tip	the	balance	from	sufficient	to	decisive	reason.19 
It	 cannot	 tip	 the	 balance	 from	 decisive	 reason	 for	 preferring	 B	 to	
sufficient	reason	for	preferring	A,	as	when	I	decide	to	be	a	philosopher,	
not	a	physician.	
Again,	 it	 is	crucial	 to	distinguish	the	phenomenon	I	am	rejecting,	
which	 concerns	 one’s	 retrospective	 preference,	 from	 a	 merely	
prospective	 shift.	 There	 is	 the	 idea	 that,	 once	 you	 have	 invested	
time	and	effort	 in	project	A,	 it	 is	rational	to	persist,	rather	than	give	
up	and	start	over	with	B,	even	when	you	should	prefer	B	to	A,	going	
18.	 A	classic	discussion	appears	in	Bratman	1987:	§2.5.
19.	 This	is	argued	by	Ruth	Chang	(2009).
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My	conjecture	is	that	attachment	to	particulars	other	than	people	
is	a	function	of	Specificity,	not	actuality.22	It	is	a	matter	of	being	more	
strongly	moved	by	 reasons	 than	by	 the	 fact	 that	 they	exist.	As	with	
nostalgia,	the	phenomenon	is	fundamentally	epistemic,	not	temporal.	
It	 turns	on	the	extent	to	which	we	know	the	pros	and	cons,	not	the	
passage	of	time,	as	such.	The	two	are	often	correlated:	as	time	goes	
by,	we	learn	more	about	one	of	the	options,	the	one	we	took,	than	we	
do	about	the	others.	But	Specificity	can	operate	in	prospect.	Imagine	a	
single	painting	as	vividly	as	you	can.	Suppose	that	it	does	not	exist.	I	
tell	you	that	there	is	decisive	reason	to	prefer	the	existence	of	another	
painting,	 which	 you	 have	 not	 imagined.	 You	 believe	 me.	 Which	
painting	do	you	want	to	exist?	Again,	it	is	not	obviously	irrational	to	
prefer	the	painting	you	imagined,	if	the	reasons	to	prefer	it	are	almost	
as	strong.	Your	desire	for	the	imaginary	painting,	like	your	desire	for	A,	
goes	beyond	your	desire	for	what	there	is	most	reason	to	want.	
This	 is	 not	 just	 a	 point	 about	 strange	 counterfactuals.	 Specificity	
would	explain	why	the	circumstance	of	deaf	parents	deciding	about	
cochlear	 implants	 for	 their	 child	 is	 quite	 unlike	 that	 of	 parents	
with	 typical	 hearing.	 The	 deaf	 parents	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 engage	
prospectively	 with	 reasons	 to	 value	 life	 as	 a	 deaf	 person	 that	 the	
hearing	parents	can	access	only	in	retrospect	and	in	part.	Even	if	the	
parents	agree	about	the	weight	of	the	reasons	there	are	—	for	instance,	
that	there	is	sufficient	reason	not	to	perform	the	operation	—	it	may	be	
rational	for	them	to	respond	in	different	ways.	For	instance,	it	may	be	
irrational	for	the	hearing	parents	not	to	choose	cochlear	implants	for	
their	child,	since	they	cannot	feel	the	force	of	the	reasons	against	that	
choice.
Nothing	turns	on	these	speculations.	The	point	 is	that	Specificity	
could	explain	the	rationality	of	attachment	to	my	actual	life.	Looking	
back	 on	 my	 mistake	 in	 deciding	 to	 take	 philosophy,	 I	 am	 moved	
not	 only	 by	 facts	 about	 the	 existence	 of	 reasons	 and	 their	 weights	
22.	Why	not	apply	this	to	people,	too?	Because,	in	the	original	case	of	N,	specific	
knowledge	is	irrelevant.	When	you	know	that	the	child	is	born,	it	is	rational	
for	your	preference	to	shift,	even	if	you	know	nothing	else	at	all.
actually	comes	about,	I	typically	end	up	knowing	more	about	what	
happens	in	A	than	about	what	would	have	happened	in	B.	When	I	
become	a	philosopher,	 I	 end	up	knowing	an	awful	 lot	 about	what	
is	 involved	 in	doing	philosophy;	 I	 know	much	 less	 about	 life	 as	 a	
doctor.	The	arguments	above	abstract	from	this.	Thus,	in	comparing	
painting	A	 to	painting	B,	 I	had	you	vividly	 imagine	both,	or	know	
nothing	 about	 either,	 and	 I	 had	 you	 learn	 that	 A	 exists	 without	
gaining	any	further	acquaintance	with	it.	In	each	version	of	the	case,	
your	knowledge	of	the	reasons	to	prefer	A	is	equal	to	your	knowledge	
of	the	reasons	to	prefer	B.	One	effect	of	equalizing	knowledge	in	this	
way	 is	 that	Specificity	gets	no	purchase	on	your	preference.	Recall	
the	principle	above:
Specificity:	It	can	be	rational	to	respond	more	strongly	to	
a	fact	that	is	a	reason	with	a	certain	weight	than	to	the	fact	
that	there	is	a	reason	with	that	weight.
Comparing	A	and	B,	you	know	that	there	is	decisive	reason	to	prefer	
B,	and	you	know	as	much	about	 the	reasons	on	one	side	as	you	do	
the	reasons	on	the	other.	You	should	prefer	B	prospectively,	and	you	
should	still	prefer	it	when	you	learn	that	A	exists.
The	temptation	to	think	otherwise	derives	from	Specificity.	Suppose	
you	imagine	two	paintings,	A	and	B,	and	you	know	you	should	prefer	
B,	but	 learn	that	A	exists	 instead.	One	effect	of	seeing	A	is	 that	you	
come	to	know	much	more	about	it.	You	are	intimately	acquainted	with	
its	colours,	its	brushwork,	its	emotional	impact.	It	is	no	longer	clear,	at	
least	to	me,	that	it	would	be	irrational	for	you	now	to	prefer	A,	if	the	
reasons	 to	prefer	B	 in	prospect	were	not	much	stronger.	 If	anything	
makes	 this	 rational,	 it	 is	 Specificity.	 You	 respond	 more	 strongly	 to	
facts	 that	 are	 reasons	 to	 prefer	A,	 facts	 of	which	 you	 have	 detailed	
knowledge,	than	to	the	fact	that	there	are	stronger	reasons	to	prefer	B,	
about	which	you	know	much	less.
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as	the	concert	and	the	play,	there	is	an	exhibit	at	the	museum,	again	
for	 one	 night	 only.	 Although	 the	 exhibit	 looks	 interesting,	 there	 is	
decisive	reason	to	prefer	the	alternatives.	I	place	tickets	to	the	museum	
in	box	A,	 tickets	 to	 the	concert	or	 the	 theatre	 in	box	B.	Would	 it	be	
rational	to	take	box	A,	moved	by	the	attractions	of	the	museum,	rather	
than	box	B,	since	you	do	not	know	what	it	contains?	Surely	not.	But	
our	case	is	different.	It	is	more	like	this:	I	place	tickets	to	the	museum	
in	box	A,	and	I	tell	you	that	box	B	contains	tickets	to	something	else,	
not	the	theatre	or	the	concert	or	anything	you	know	about.	I	give	you	
a	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	museum	 exhibit,	 vividly	 conveying	 its	
appeal,	but	add	that	there	is	decisive	reason	to	prefer	what	is	in	box	
B.	You	believe	me	—	the	issue	is	not	lack	of	trust	—	but	I	do	not	tell	you	
what	the	reasons	are.	If	Specificity	makes	attachment	rational,	it	could	
be	rational	to	prefer	box	A,	so	long	as	the	reasons	to	prefer	what	is	in	
box	B	are	not	much	stronger.	Your	desire	for	A,	unlike	your	desire	for	
B,	responds	not	only	to	the	fact	that	there	are	reasons,	but	to	reasons	
themselves:	to	what	you	know	about	the	exhibit.
Does	 Specificity	 work	 this	 way?	 Here	 my	 thoughts	 give	 out.	 I	
am	 ambivalent	 about	 the	 power	 of	 Specificity	 to	 justify	 akratic	
preference.24	What	I	have	argued	for	is	conditional:	if	there	is	such	a	
thing	as	rational	attachment	to	activities	or	objects,	it	is	explained	by	
a	radical	application	of	Specificity,	not	by	attachment	to	what	is	actual,	
as	such.	Philosophers	who	treat	these	attachments	in	the	way	we	treat	
attachments	to	other	people	are	making	a	mistake.
III
Is	 regret	 so	 awful?	 Should	 we	 devote	 such	 diligent	 reflection	 to	
avoiding	or	containing	it?	More	to	the	point,	should	I?
I	 leave	 that	 question	 to	 you,	 though	 I	 enlist	 on	 my	 side	 Frank	
Bascombe,	the	sportswriter	in	Richard	Ford’s	1986	novel:
24.	 This	sort	of	akrasia	is	quite	different	from	that	considered	by	Alison	McIntyre	
(1990)	and	Nomy	Arpaly	(2000).	They	defend	the	rationality	of	acting	(and	
so	preferring)	 in	ways	 that	 conflict	with	 false	beliefs	 about	 the	balance	of	
reasons;	it	is	distinctive	of	our	examples	that	the	conflicting	belief	is	true.
but	 by	 a	 richly	 textured	 knowledge	 of	what	 is	 good	 about	 a	 life	 as	
a	philosopher.	 I	 lack	 such	knowledge	of	 the	 reasons	 to	be	 a	doctor,	
something	I	know	about	only	in	general	terms.	It	 is	not	that,	having	
decided	on	philosophy,	there	is	new	reason	to	prefer	that	life,	as	there	
is	new	reason	to	be	glad	 that	you	did	not	wait	once	N	 is	born.	 I	do	
not	believe	that	the	balance	of	reasons	has	changed	or	that	my	earlier	
judgement,	in	favour	of	medicine,	was	wrong.	The	difference	is	in	how	
I	relate	to	the	reasons	there	are.	If	it	is	rational	to	prefer	in	retrospect	
what	I	know	to	be	an	inferior	life,	Specificity	explains	why.23
I	have	said	more	than	once	that	I	do	not	find	it	obvious	that	this	
preference	 is	 irrational.	 But	 it	 involves	 an	 application	 of	 Specificity	
much	 more	 radical	 than	 those	 in	 section	 I.	 In	 cases	 of	 normative	
parity,	it	is	rational	to	be	more	strongly	moved	by	one	consideration	
than	another,	despite	your	knowledge	that	it	is	not	a	stronger	reason.	
You	 end	 up	 rationally	 preferring	 A	 to	 B	—	the	 concert	 to	 the	 play,	
perhaps	—	even	though	it	is	not	the	case	that	you	should	prefer	A	to	
B,	and	you	know	it.	What	we	are	now	imagining	is	more	extreme:	the	
existence	of	cases	in	which	it	is	rational	to	prefer	A	when	you	know	
there	 is	more	reason	to	want	B:	preferring	what	you	know	is	worse.	
What	makes	 this	 rational	 is	 ignorance	 of	 the	 reasons	 to	 prefer	 the	
better	option.
In	assessing	the	plausibility	of	this	idea,	it	is	important	to	stress	how	
deep	your	ignorance	runs.	It	is	not	just	ignorance	of	which	outcome	
will	 result	 from	a	 choice,	 but	 of	what	 the	outcomes	 are.	Here	 is	 an	
analogy:	Think	back	to	the	choice	of	tickets	and	suppose	that,	as	well	
23.	My	argument	draws	a	 contrast	between	decisions	 that	affect	 the	existence	
of	a	person	and	ones	that	affect	the	existence	of	a	project	or	a	thing.	What	
about	decisions	that	affect	relationships	and	their	objects,	but	not	the	exis-
tence	of	those	involved?	What	justifies	a	shift	in	preference	here,	of	the	sort	
we	found	in	my	friendship	with	N?	Is	it	the	actual	existence	of	the	relation-
ship	or	specific	knowledge	of	its	features?	This	is	difficult.	On	the	one	hand,	I	
do	not	think	the	shift	essentially	depends	on	the	qualities	of	my	relationship	
with	N	or	knowledge	of	these	qualities.	On	the	other	hand,	it	may	involve	
acquaintance	with	N,	so	that	I	am	in	a	position	to	be	moved	by	the	fact	of	my	
relationship,	specifically,	with	him.	If	we	allow	for	reasons	of	this	kind,	we	
can	model	the	effects	of	personal	attachment	with	Specificity.	But	the	model	
does	not	apply	elsewhere.
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detail	of	alternative	possibilities.	Do	not	think	about	what	might	have	
been:	“where	ignorance	is	bliss,/	’Tis	folly	to	be	wise.”25 , 26
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